“If we have data, let’s look at the data. If all we have are opinions, let’s go with mine.”

We’re operators. We built AlignICP because we needed it and it didn’t exist. For ten years, I ran quarterly win-loss analysis at every company I worked at. Forty quarters in spreadsheets, on weekends, between board meetings. I learned more about how B2B revenue actually works there than in any strategy offsite.

Then in 2020, I joined a company that grew 400% during COVID. We thought we were geniuses. Twelve months later, we had a churn problem nobody could explain. The data showed 90% of customers acquired during the boom were outside our ICP. Sales took every meeting. Marketing widened every filter. CS onboarded everyone who signed. Nobody made a wrong call individually. Collectively, we built a customer base the company couldn’t retain — and only saw it after the damage was done, in NRR, in headcount cuts, in the careers of people I cared about.

That’s when I understood: bad targeting isn’t a marketing problem or a sales problem. It’s a career problem. It’s the thing that ends the run of the operators who built the company.

We built AlignICP so no operator has to find that out the way I did — too late, after the layoffs.

This is the work. It’s unglamorous. It’s data plumbing, consensus building, and the willingness to tell a CRO that the segments they have conviction about aren’t the segments the data supports. Most companies won’t do it. That’s fine. AlignICP isn’t built for most companies. It’s built for the operators who believe the work has to be done.